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1 Introduction
Corruption, whether it is undertaken by an individual or an organization, occurs everywhere in
the world (albeit in varying degrees among different countries) and significantly impacts various do-
mains of life. For example, one in four citizens worldwide had to pay a bribe in 2016 (Transparency
International, 2017), while businesses and individuals pay more than $1 trillion in bribes every
year (Rose-Ackerman, 2004). Corruption has been found to reduce economic growth (Mauro, 1995;
Me´on and Sekkat, 2005; Grundler and Potrafke, 2019), to increase income inequality and poverty
(Gupta et al., 2002), to undermine meritocracy (Del Monte and Papagni, 2001), to hinder SMEs
access to financing (Ullah, 2020), to decrease voter turnout (Dahlberg and Solevid, 2016) as well
as to lower life expectancy, and inflict higher mortality rates for mothers and children (Holmberg
and Rothstein, 2011; Li et al., 2018; Dincer and Teoman, 2019; Achim et al., 2020).
Many organizations have attempted to survey why civilians engage in bribing. The most com-
monly cited reason as to why civilians decide to participate in bribing is to “speed things up”
(Transparency International, 2013). Similarly, when businessmen are pressed to answer why they
engage in corruption, they often respond “because everyone else is doing it” (OECD, 2018). Fur-
thermore, in countries with very high levels of corruption and poorly funded administrations, many
consider that “there is no other way to obtain a service” than bribing (Integrity Watch, 2016).
The three aforementioned responses may be viewed as distinctively different motivations or, by
some more sceptical, as merely excuses aimed to justify one’s actions. However, when access to
public services is provided by public administrations sequentially (as it is the case for example for,
construction permits, health and safety inspections and most documentation provided by public
administrations), these three motivations, as we show below, are inextricably intertwined.
The key motivation behind this article is the observation that when civilians apply for a permit
to a public administration, their applications are added in a queue, where each is reviewed based
on the order they were submitted. If no bribing takes place, this process is efficient (as there is
no need for sorting) and, arguably, fair. However, if corruption is systemic and the majority of
the population bribes to move their application forward in the queue, the fair-minded minority
may face severe delays until their application is reviewed, and in extreme cases, is at risk of being
stuck perpetually at the end of the queue. Such stories are very common in the local media of
countries with high rates of corruption, like Greece, but occasionally they also attract the attention
of international outlets.1
The importance of queues in processes has been a key area of interest in operations research (e.g.
Loch and Wu, 2007; Shunko et al., 2018), engineering (e.g. Dshalalow, 1997), finance (e.g. Inoue and
Sazuka, 2010; Bo et al., 2011), consumer behavior (e.g. Zhou and Soman, 2008), psychology (e.g.
1For instance, Daley (2012) reports for the New York Times the story of a Greek entrepreneur stuck
between red tape and his objection to pay a “speed bribe” leading to a 10 month wait until he finally
obtained relevant permits to start his e-business. Similarly, Hope (2016) describes for the Financial Times,
how a UK investor had to wait for 25 years until they were granted with the relevant work permits to start
the construction of a tourist resort in the island of Crete.
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Milgram et al., 1986; Schmitt et al., 1992), healthcare (e.g. Green, 2006; Peter and Sivasamy, 2019),
and traffic management, be it on the street (e.g. Heidemann, 2001) or in the cloud (e.g. Vilaplana
et al., 2014). In economics, despite some notable exceptions (Stiglitz, 1992; Chen et al., 2007; Stein
et al., 2007; Dold and Khadjavi, 2017), the role of queues has been largely neglected, especially in
relation to how they might be instrumental in institutional corruption. Two key implications stem
from the queuing process in the provision of public services. First, that if corruption is systemic,
public officials do not need to harass the civilians to instigate a bribe, as the harassment is caused
in the form of a negative externality by the other civilians who bribe to jump the queue. Second,
it generates two different motivations or classes of bribes: (i) queue-jumping bribes, which aim to
increase the briber’s expected earnings by jumping the queue, and (ii) counter-bribes, which aim
to maintain the briber’s expected earnings by upholding current order in the queue. Although for
the briber both bribes are profit maximising, arguably the latter carries a much lower moral cost.
Thus, counter-bribes could explain how even fair-minded individuals may feel justified in engaging
in bribing, or why some may proactively bribe to ensure access to public services which they deem
instrumental to their livelihood (Sweeney et al., 2013). In this article, we introduce a new bribery
game, henceforth the queue-jumping game, aimed to capture the impact of this sequentiality in
administration processes in bribing behavior and evaluate whether these two different types of
bribes could, in part, explain the puzzling results on the relationship between bribing attitudes and
culture (see Abbink and Serra, 2012; Banuri and Eckel, 2012).
Traditionally, corruption in economics has been considered as a straightforward profit maxi-
mization problem where civilians and public officials weigh the benefits from engaging in bribing
to the risk of getting caught (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1975). Since the seminal
study of Abbink et al. (2002), a growing experimental literature has utilized the unique advantage
of laboratory studies to (i) directly observe corrupt behavior, (ii) isolate and manipulate institu-
tional frameworks and hence (iii) test anti-corruption policies, both within and between different
populations (Banuri and Eckel, 2015). A key result that stems from the experimental literature is
that civilians are not concerned solely with their self-interest. Instead, many individuals even when
it would be profit-maximizing to do so, prefer to abstain from corruption (e.g. van Veldhuizen,
2013; Abbink et al., 2014; Banerjee, 2016a,b; Abbink and Wu, 2017; Abbink et al., 2018; Ryvkin
and Serra, 2020). Allowing for other-regarding preferences (e.g. Andreoni, 1990; Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2007; Bicchieri et al., 2020) has helped explain
some of the observed discrepancies in behavior by appreciating that, at least for some people, the
decision to bribe also depends on their perception of its appropriateness or the welfare implications
of bribing towards the rest of the population. Yet, why corruption varies so strongly across nations,
has remained a puzzling question. Several studies have attempted to test whether cultural differ-
ences could explain the observed heterogeneity either through cross-country experiments (Alatas
et al., 2009; Cameron et al., 2009; Banuri and Eckel, 2015; Frank et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2015;
Gaggero et al., 2018) or with international student samples (Barr and Serra, 2010; Salmon and
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Serra, 2017). Even though lab experiments provide the opportunity for researchers to isolate the
impact of cultural differences by keeping institutional environments constant, the results from these
studies have been somewhat mixed.2
Moreover, the influence of ethnic diversity on a country’s public good provision and economic
performance is at the center of public policy discussions on immigration. In the last 10 years,
many have questioned the value of ethnically diverse populations, despite the fact that a number
of studies highlight the positive impact that migration has on economic growth (e.g., Ortega and
Peri, 2014; Boubtane et al., 2016; Borjas, 2019). For example, in the case of the UK, a stricter
migration policy was a central argument of the pro-BREXIT campaigners, who fear-mongered the
British population with posters of long lines of Syrian refugees waiting to enter to the UK, if the
British citizens voted to remain in the EU. The extent to which, and the rate by which, ethnic
minorities assimilate the cultural norms of a country are central to these discussions (Hooghe et al.,
2009; Schmid et al., 2014). However, in empirical studies, identifying the direction and causality
of (potential) spillover effects can be extremely arduous. Intercultural corruption experiments can
provide important insights both on the potential impact of an influx of ethnically diverse minority to
the cultural norms of a host country and how anti-corruption policies could be affected by cultural
diversity. To the best of our knowledge, the studies of Barr and Serra (2010) and Salmon and Serra
(2017) are the only ones we are aware off that attempt to analyze how intercultural interactions
influence bribing attitudes, or how cultural diversity could impact anti-corruption policy. Barr and
Serra (2010) find that country of origin is strongly correlated with a students’ propensity to bribe
in the first year of university, but the observed differences disappear by the time they graduate,
which is an important result for migration policy. Moreover, Salmon and Serra (2017) observe that
informal behavioral policies such as social judgment are much more likely to reduce corruption
among individuals who identify culturally with countries characterized by low levels of corruption.
To examine whether differences in bribing attitudes across countries could be explained by
sequentiality in public service provision, we conducted two (cross-country) treatments in Athens,
Greece and Nuremberg, Germany. According to the 2019 Corruption Perception Index (Trans-
parency International, 2020), Germany is ranked as the 9th least corrupt country globally, while
Greece is ranked 60th. This large gap in corruption levels between the two countries would suggest
that if differences in corruption are to be attributed to culture, we should observe that Greek par-
ticipants queue-jump and counter-bribe relatively more often than the German participants, ceteris
2For instance, Cameron et al. (2009) conducted a cross-country bribery experiment in Australia, Sin-
gapore, India and Indonesia. The first two countries are consistently ranked among the countries with the
lowest corruption levels worldwide whereas the last two are consistently ranked among the countries with
the highest corruption levels. Indians were most likely to bribe and less likely to punish than Australians,
Indonesians and Singaporeans. Yet, Indians and Singaporeans were equally likely to accept bribes and were
significantly more likely than Australians and Indonesians to accept one. Similarly, Banuri and Eckel (2015)
conducted a cross-country bribery experiment in Pakistan and the United States. In contrast to a cultural
explanation to bribery attitudes, they found no significant differences in bribing behavior between Pakistan
and the US. However, when punishment is introduced, its efficacy in curbing corruption is significant higher
in the US than in Pakistan.
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paribus. Furthermore, this difference should be symmetric, (i.e., that both counter-bribes and queue
jumping bribes would be at the same level among Greek participants) in line with game-theoretic
predictions. However, we hypothesize that it is possible that because the Greek participants have
experienced much higher levels of institutional corruption, relatively to their German counterparts,
they would counter-bribe more often, resulting to an asymmetric effect between the two treatments.
Furthermore, to examine how intercultural interactions influence bribing attitudes we conducted
two additional treatments, where one of the three civilians in our queue-jumping game is Greek
(German) while the remaining members and the public official are Germans (Greek). In both
treatments, every participant is aware of the group composition, but only the minority can identify
itself. This feature of our design allows us to control for reputational gains and social image
concerns (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Consequently, we are able to analyze the bribing attitudes
of minorities from countries with lower (higher) levels of reported corruption. In order to be
able to allow interaction of subjects from Greece and Germany, the experiment was conducted
simultaneously at the Laboratory for Experimental Research Nuremberg (LERN) in Germany and
the Laboratory of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Science in Athens, Greece (LaBEES-
Athens), and involved a total of 604 participants.
In our cross-cultural treatments, we find that Greeks tend to bribe more often than Germans,
but only in the early periods of the game. At the first of the twenty-four periods of our experiment,
the Greek groups are 27% more likely to engage in bribing relative to the German groups. However,
by the tenth period, the Germans quickly catch-up, and all differences between Greek and German
groups disappear. This result, taken literally, would be particularly positive news for policymakers
as it would suggest that, at least in the medium to long-term, financial incentives rather than
culture is what drives bribing attitudes. However, despite that the Greek authors of this article
expected that the differences in overall bribe rates are going to be driven primarily from counter-
bribes, we find the opposite effect. According to our results, the differences in bribing rates are
driven by queue-jumping bribes. An important implication of this observation is that as the ratio
of counter-bribes to queue-jumping bribes is significantly lower among Greeks relative to Germans,
bribing to queue-jump is more profitable in Greek groups, which in turn could explain short-term
differences in bribing rates among countries with similar institutions.
In our inter-cultural treatments, surprisingly, we find that minorities, irrespective of their na-
tionality, bribe less, despite that there are no prospects for monetary or reputational gains. This
result could not be explained by cultural differences nor differences in beliefs, as both would predict
that minorities would bribe more rather than less often. Consequently, by induction, we conclude
that minorities tend to behave more prosocially. This interpretation, although novel in the context
of bribery, is in line with a large body of research in psychology on outgroup favoritism by minority
groups (e.g., Hinkle and Brown, 1990; Jost and Burgess, 2000; Hewstone et al., 2002) as well as the
findings of Tsutsui and Zizzo (2014) on the prosociality of minority groups.
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following manner: Section 2 introduces the
5
experimental design, procedures and presents the research hypotheses, Section 3 reports the exper-
imental results, and Section 4 discusses our findings and concludes the article.
2 Experimental Design
We start this section with presenting the queue-jumping game (Section 2.1). Afterwards, we
explain our treatments and research hypotheses (Section 2.2). Finally, we discuss the experimental
procedures and the methodological decisions that pertain our design (Section 2.3).
2.1 The Queue-Jumping Game
Our queue-jumping game consists of four players: one public official (P ) and three civilians,
Ci = {C1, C2, C3}. The game is played for a finite number of periods, where t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 24},
and the total number of periods is common knowledge. We denote the order by which civilians are
queued to receive a public service with q = {1, 2, 3}. A civilian receives w = 100, in period t, if she
is first in the queue and nothing otherwise.
In the absence of bribing, the public official serves the civilians on a first-come, first-served
basis, earning herself/himself in each period a fixed salary f = 35. The civilians who in period
t are second and third in the queue, in period t + 1 are advanced to first and second in queue,
respectively. Meanwhile, the civilian who was first in queue re-joins it at the back of the line. In
queuing theory terminology, this feature of our game implies that in our experiment, arrival rates
equal service times at all periods. Furthermore, as there is only one public official serving the
civilians, the number of civilians waiting in queue, Lq, is constant with Lq =
∑
iCi − 1 = 2 ∀ t.
When a civilian is third in the queue in period t, she can choose to pay a bribe b = 20 to the
public official in order to be first in queue in the next period. In line with the past literature, the
bribe, b, entails an administrative cost c = 5, capturing the social welfare loss of corruption. We
refer to bribes offered by civilians who are third in the queue as queue-jumping bribes. For a civilian
who is second in line, it is rational to bribe only if he/she anticipates that the civilian who is second
in the queue would bribe to queue-jump. Hence, we refer to bribes offered by civilians when they
are second in the queue as counter-bribes. When both civilians bribe at the same period, the public
official receives both bribes and one of the two civilians is randomly selected to be first in line in
the next period. Let si,t be the index of actions Ci may take at period t, if q 6= 1→ si ∈ {0, b} and
if q = 1→ si ∈ {∅}. A Ci’s payoff in the first period is then given by:
pii,t=1 =


w, qi,1 = 1, si = 0
0, qi,1 6= 1, si = 0
−b, qi,1 6= 1, si = b
(1)
As qi,t is a function of qi,t−1 and the civilians bribing decisions, we can write qi,t as a stepwise
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function in the following manner:
qi,t =


3, qi,t−1 = 1
2, qi,t−1 = 3, si,t−1 = 0, s−i,t−1 = 0
1, qi,t−1 = 2, si,t−1 = 0, s−i,t−1 = 0
1, qi,t−1 6= 1, si,t−1 = b, s−i,t−1 = 0
2, qi,t−1 6= 1, si,t−1 = 0, s−i,t−1 = b
1, p ≤ 0.5, qi,t−1 6= 1, si,t−1 = b, s−i,t−1 = b
2, p > 0.5, qi,t−1 6= 1, si,t−1 = b, s−i,t−1 = b
(2)
In the first three cases, the order is determined solely by the ordering process, whereas in the
fourth and fifth cases the order is determined by the bribing decision. In the sixth case, where both
civilians choose to bribe, the probability, p, to be first in the queue, is given by p = 1/Lq = 0.5.
Thus, if both civilians bribe there is a 50% chance that Ci is going to be first in queue and a 50%
chance to be second in queue.
To simplify exposition, consider bribing in period t − 1 as part of a civilians payoff in period
t. Consequently, from Equations 1 and 2, we can write the payoff function of Ci when second or
third in the queue in period t as:
pii,t =


wt, qi,t−1 = 2, si,t = 0, s−i,t = 0
0, qi,t−1 = 3, si,t = 0, s−i,t = 0
wt − bt−1, qi,t−1 = 2, si,t = b, s−i,t = 0
wt − bt−1, qi,t−1 = 3, si,t = b, s−i,t = 0
(1/Lq)wt − bt−1, qi,t−1 6= 1, si,t = b, s−i,t = b
(3)
We can then represent the decision problem of the two civilians waiting in line as a stage game
at period t, as in Figure 1. By backward induction, we can infer that a self-interested civilian’s
strategy si, when there are not first in queue is to bribe, if 0.5w− b > 0; which is always true with
our parameterization.
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Figure 1: Stage game at period t
Notes: In our experiment, w = 100, and b = 20. Thus, the Nash equilibrium is for both players to always
bribe.
Given the stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then by backward induction the repeated
game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where every civilian plays the Nash equilib-
rium of the stage game, i.e., always bribe when not first in line. Notice that from a game-theoretic
perspective, if the civilians are solely interested with a payoff maximization, queue-jumping and
counter-bribes differ from each other only in name.
Table 1: Examples of expected profits (in ECUs)
Those who
bribe
Those who do not
bribe
Public
Official
Administrative
costs
Example 1: None of the players
attempt to queue-jump
-
800
(3 players)
840 0
Example 2: One of the players
always attempts to queue-jump
960
(1 player)
600
(2 players)
1020 60
Example 3: Two of the players
always attempt to queue-jump
960
(2 players)
0
(1 player)
1185 115
Example 4: All the players at-
tempt to queue-jump
493†
(3 players)
- 1530 230
Notes: † expected value after 24 periods.
Furthermore, Table 1 provides illustrative examples of expected total profits in Experimental
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Currency Units (ECU) for each player given the parameterization in our experiment. If none of
the civilians bribe (Example 1 in Table 1), then each civilian is expected to be first in line eight
times, thus earning a payoff of 800 ECU, while the public official earns 840 ECU. If one of the
civilians always bribes while the the remaining two civilians abstain from bribing (Example 2 in
Table 1), then the civilian who always bribes would earn 960 ECU while the remaining civilians
would earn 600 ECU. In this case, the public official would earn an additional 180 ECU in bribes
while the social welfare loss would amount to 60 ECU. Similarly, if two civilians always bribe, while
one civilian never bribes (Example 3 in Table 1), those who always bribe would earn 960 ECU,
whereas, the civilian who never bribes would earn nothing. As a result of the increase in bribes,
the public official would earn 1185 ECU while the administrative costs would increase to 115 ECU.
Finally, if, in line with game theoretic predictions, all civilians bribe in every period (Example 4
in Table 1), on average, each participant would earn 493 ECU, the public official would earn 1530
ECU, and the administrative costs would amount to a total of 230 ECU. Note, that part of our
motivation behind our parameterization is that if civilians exhibit outcome-driven other-regarding
preferences such as inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or maximin preferences (Charness
and Rabin, 2002), then they should abstain from bribing.
2.2 Treatments and Hypotheses
Table 2 summarizes our experimental treatments. We used a 2 × 2 factorial design where
we varied the country of origin of the participants between Greece and Germany and the group
composition between monocultural and multicultural groups. Specifically, in the Greeks-only and
Germans-only treatments all group members were from Germany and Greece, while in the Greeks-
majority and Germans-majority treatments, one of the three civilians in the group was of German
and Greek nationality respectively.
Table 2: Experimental Design
Nationality
Greek German
Group
Composition
Monocultural Greeks-only Germans-only
Multicultural Greeks-majority Germans-majority
Following the literature on culture, and the results on corruption levels by Transparency Inter-
national (2017, 2020), our first hypothesis is that on average bribe rates in our experiment would
be higher in the Greeks-only relative to the Germans-only treatment.
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Hypothesis 1 Given the corruption rates is higher in Greece than in Germany, aggregate bribe
rates will be higher in the Greeks-only treatment relative to the Germans-only treatment.
Our second hypothesis, in contrast to game-theoretic predictions, is that Greek participants
would counter-bribe more often than German participants, in response to higher expectations of
bribing relative to the Germans.
Hypothesis 2 The aggregate differences in bribe rates between Greek and German groups would
be explained by differences in counter-bribes rather than queue-jumping bribes.
In multicultural groups, we expect that bribe rates would be higher on average, as a result of
the decreased social cohesion (Friedkin, 2004) and increased distrust across participants of different
nationalities (Bornhorst et al., 2010; Dieckmann et al., 2016).
Hypothesis 3 Aggregate bribe rates will be higher in the multicultural groups relative to monocul-
tural groups.
2.3 Procedures
To control for house money effects (Ackert et al., 2006) and to add an element of realism to
the experiment, when a civilian was first in line they had to complete a real effort task. The real
effort task, adopted from Abeler et al. (2011), involved counting the number of zeros shown in a
4× 4 matrix. We chose to use a real effort task as we thought it adds realism, but we ensured that
is sufficiently simple enough so that all subjects can complete it successfully. In the two practice
rounds prior to the main experiment, participants were given the chance to try out the task and
thereby familiarize themselves with it. In fact, 99.7% of all subjects solved the zero counting task
successfully at the first practice period and 96.7% in both periods.
Furthermore, public officials in our design played a passive role, accepting all bribes. Their
sole responsibility was to confirm the correct completion of the real effort task by the civilian in
each round. This feature of our design controls for potential heterogeneity in the behavior of public
officials allowing us to focus on the behavior of civilians. Importantly it simplified civilians decisions
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as they only had to consider whether the other civilian will choose to pay to jump the queue, rather
than whether their bribe offer would be accepted.
Finally, in contrast to past literature, we did not include a probability of getting caught from
engaging in bribing behaviour. Though it is often the norm to include a punishment probability,
many other studies do not always incorporate this feature in their experimental designs (e.g. Frank
and Schulze, 2000; Banerjee, 2016b; Azfar and Nelson, 2007). Traditionally they idea of including
a probability of getting caught has been motivated from an interest in analysing how people would
respond to a change in the risk of getting caught and in drawing treatment comparisons with other
anti-corruption policies (e.g. Abbink et al., 2002; Banuri and Eckel, 2015). As the focus of our
study has been on the tension between bribing to queue-jump and bribing to maintain the current
position in the queue, not including a risk of getting caught does not influence our ability to assess
our research hypotheses.
All sessions were conducted simultaneously in laboratories in Germany and Greece (the Labo-
ratory for Experimental Research Nuremberg/LERN and the Laboratory for Behavioral and Ex-
perimental Economics Science/LaBEES-Athens). We opted for conducting all treatments simul-
taneously, in order to ensure that the only difference between the monocultural and multicultural
treatments is group composition, thus to control for the necessity of conducting sessions simulta-
neously in the two labs in the multicultural treatments. Before each session started, all subjects
were notified that they will be interacting with subjects from another lab, and via a projector we
showed the two labs to participants through a conference call that lasted approximately for 20
seconds. In the multicultural groups, the civilian who was the minority was aware that the rest of
the group contained members of the other nationality but no one in the group could identify them,
thus controlling for social image and reputation effects.
Instructions were written originally in English and translated to Greek and German by a pro-
fessional translator. In addition, two native speakers translated the instructions back to English
(Brislin, 1970). Subsequently, all passages that differed between the three English versions were
adjusted and the respective adjustments were accommodated in the German and Greek instruc-
tions. At the start of each sessions the instructions were read aloud in the respective language by
two of the authors (one in Athens and one in Nuremberg) who also served as the experimenters.
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Afterwards, subjects went through a set of control questions. After all subjects completed the
control questions, the experimenters asked the participants if they have any questions. Questions
were taken privately and answered publicly by the experimenters. Finally, subjects participated in
two practice periods, in which they became familiar with the real effort task.
A total of 604 subjects participated in our experiment, of which 64.3% (61.8%) were female
in Germany (Greece). The average age was 22.62 years old (S.D. = 3.19) in Germany and 19.95
years old (S.D. = 2.16) in Greece. All sessions were conducted using the experimental software z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and coordinated via the organizational software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
Decisions were taken in private in cubicles and communication among participants was prohibited.
Each session lasted approximately 120 minutes.3 The experimental currency was converted into
Euro at an exchange rate of 1 ECU = e0.02 and paid out in cash at the end of the experiment.
Participants earned e23.30 on average (S.D. = 4.97), including a show-up fee of e4.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 summarizes the bribe rates across treatments, and position in the queue. Overall,
subjects select to bribe 65.9% of the times. When comparing aggregate bribe rates for both types
of bribes and all periods the differences between Greeks (67.6%) and Germans (64%) are negligible.
Aggregate counter-bribe rates are also rather similar at 62.6% for Greek participants and 61.5% for
3Over the past years a common concern with laboratory experiments has been the extent to which
experimental findings involving volunteered university students are generalizable to representative samples
(Levitt and List, 2007). Concerns about the representativeness of student samples can be separated into two
potential effects: (i) student bias, which exists if students behave differently than the general population,
after controlling for socio-demographics, and (ii) volunteer bias, which exists if participants who self-select
to voluntarily participate in laboratory experiments behave systematically different from non-volunteers.
With regards to student bias, there are a number of studies which find that students tend to behave more
selfishly than non-students (e.g. Exadaktylos et al., 2013; Falk et al., 2013; Cappelen et al., 2015; Belot et al.,
2015). However, such differences are rather small in the majority of cases (e.g. Exadaktylos et al., 2013; Falk
et al., 2013; Snowberg and Yariv, 2018; Frigau et al., 2019), disappear when one controls for socioeconomic
characteristics (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2008), and always follow the same behavioral patterns. In relation to
volunteering bias, a number of studies report no statistically significant differences between volunteers and
non-volunteers (Falk et al., 2013; Bellemare et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2013). Nevertheless, in interpreting
our results, one should be cautious in drawing generalizable inferences and keep in mind that university
students tend on average to behave more selfishly relative to representative samples.
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German participants. However, in queue-jumping bribes, the difference increases to 72.8$ for the
Greek participants and 66.5% for German participants. The difference on queue-jumping bribes
widens when we compare the Greek-only treatment (74%) with the German-only treatment (62.4%).
Another insight we gain from Table 3 is that as we move from a Germans-only monocultural group
to groups with more Greeks, mean bribe rates increase. This is consistent irrespective of whether
we pool over all types of bribes or whether we just look at counter-bribes or queue-jumping bribes.
Table 3: Bribe rates (in %) across treatments, subject pools and position in queue
All bribes
Counter bribes
(2nd place in queue)
Queue-jumping bribes
(3rd place in queue)
Treatment N of subjects
Greeks &
Germans
Greeks Germans Greeks Germans Greeks Germans
Germans-
only
0 Greeks -
3 Germans
61.6 - 61.6 - 60.8 - 62.4
Germans-
majority
1 Greek -
2 Germans
64.0 60.7 65.8 58.3 60.7 63.8 70.3
Greeks-
majority
2 Greeks -
1 German
69.6 70.6 67.6 65.9 64.6 75.0 70.9
Greeks-
only
3 Greeks -
0 Germans
68.1 68.1 - 62.2 - 74.0 -
All treatments 65.9 67.6 64.0 62.6 61.5 72.8 66.5
Similar insights can be gained by examining Figures 2 to 4 which show bribe rates by groups
and periods. A common observation in all figures is that as time progresses bribe rates increase,
with the exception of the last round in which we observe an end-game effect. Figure 2 shows that
the difference in bribe rates is more pronounced between the Greeks-only and the Germans-only
groups but only for the early periods. When we graph bribe rates separately for counter-bribes and
queue-jumping bribes, in Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively, we observe that the difference between
groups shown in Figure 2 is mainly influenced by queue-jumping bribes and not counter-bribes. As
shown in Figure 3, counter-bribe rates practically overlap across all periods.
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Figure 2: Bribe rates by period and group (all bribes)
Figure 3: Counter bribe rates by period and group
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Figure 4: Queue-jumping bribe rates by period and group
In addition to such descriptive statistics, we classified subjects according to the strategies they
might have used. We excluded the last period of the game because of end-game effects and find
that only a small portion of subjects (43 subjects) followed the Nash equilibrium strategy of always
bribing. In addition, subjects playing the Nash equilibrium are roughly equally split between
groups: 13 subjects in the Germans-only group, 11 subjects in the Greeks-only group, 9 subjects in
the Germans-majority and 10 subjects in the Greeks-majority group. We also find that 3 subjects
play the grim trigger strategy (i.e., not bribing initially but bribing thereafter as soon as they
are queue-jumped) but none plays a tit-for-tat strategy. Moreover, 14 subjects never bribed at
any occasion and 5 subjects never bribed to queue-jump (although they counter-bribed in other
occasions).
Given the binary nature of the variable of interest (pay to bypass the queue or not), the observed
differences of bribe rates between the four different groups can also be tested statistically with a
χ2 test. Table 4 shows the results of a χ2 test by period and bribe type.4 There are two results
4Another approach usually taken in the experimental economics literature is to calculate the mean over
all rounds and then perform statistical analysis on the means of the data. Harrison (2007) explains the
pitfalls of undertaking analysis on statistics of the observations (as opposed on the actual observations) and
the problems derived from the use of inappropriate metrics of evaluation. Harrison (2007) then shows that
undertaking analysis over the units of observations produces entirely opposite results than those presented
in Clark (2002) which performed statistical analysis over averages. Having said that, any analysis of only
15
Table 4: Chi-square tests by bribe type and period
All bribes
Counter bribes
(2nd place in queue)
Queue-jumping bribes
(3rd place in queue)
χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
P1 9.734 0.021∗∗ 3.429 0.330 9.263 0.026∗∗
P2 6.536 0.088∗ 2.971 0.396 4.869 0.182
P3 5.925 0.115 5.398 0.145 7.671 0.053∗
P4 16.272 0.001∗∗∗ 6.071 0.108 10.743 0.013∗∗
P5 3.533 0.317 0.809 0.847 3.664 0.300
P6 2.804 0.423 1.298 0.730 1.616 0.656
P7 1.805 0.614 4.110 0.250 0.710 0.871
P8 2.715 0.438 0.414 0.937 6.407 0.093∗
P9 1.309 0.727 0.383 0.944 1.238 0.744
P10 4.638 0.200 0.398 0.941 9.568 0.023∗∗
P11 2.912 0.405 1.524 0.677 3.457 0.326
P12 0.454 0.929 0.945 0.815 0.275 0.965
P13 1.616 0.656 0.813 0.846 0.966 0.809
P14 0.813 0.846 2.759 0.430 2.601 0.457
P15 2.871 0.412 0.865 0.834 2.751 0.432
P16 4.171 0.244 4.559 0.207 1.022 0.796
P17 1.006 0.800 5.491 0.139 3.521 0.318
P18 2.696 0.441 2.012 0.570 2.724 0.436
P19 1.707 0.635 0.678 0.878 2.722 0.436
P20 7.486 0.058 8.850 0.031∗∗ 0.789 0.852
P21 0.204 0.977 1.220 0.748 2.162 0.539
P22 2.000 0.572 0.741 0.864 2.211 0.530
P23 2.944 0.400 0.671 0.880 3.755 0.289
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. P1 to P23 denotes Period 1 to Period 23.
coming out of this table. First, that differences in bribe rates between groups are significant only
for the early period of the experiment. Second, that differences between the groups are statistically
significant only for queue-jumping bribes and not for counter-bribes.
one round data discards information (as any aggregation across rounds) and this is why non-parametric tests
cannot easily condition on all the information available. The regression analysis approach we offer in the
next section tries to mitigate this concern by conditioning on all the information we have available. Harrison
(2007) further notes that Pagan and Ullah (1999) acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of the field of
non-parametric econometrics and view non-parametric econometrics as complementary to parametric tools.
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3.2 Regression Analysis
In this section we discuss the results of random effects probit models with clustered standard
errors at the group level. Table 5 shows coefficient estimates from four different specifications.
Model (1) uses group dummies, a period variable and a last period dummy as well as a dummy
that captures whether the subject was in the third place in queue (vs. the second place in queue).5
As we observe, none of the group dummies is statistically significant. There is, however, a significant
positive effect of periods i.e., the probability of bribing increases across periods while in the very
last period the probability of bribing decreases. In addition, the ‘3rd in queue’ dummy positively
affects the probability of bribing which is to say that subjects have a higher probability of offering
queue-jumping bribes than counter bribes.
Model (2) augments the specification by adding interaction terms of the group dummies and
the period variable. This was done to capture the differential effect of groups across periods as
evident in Figures 2 to 4 and Table 4. A Likelihood ratio (LR) test indicates that the model
with interaction terms (model (2)) fits the data significantly better (χ2 = 23.3, p− value < 0.001)
than the model with no interaction terms (model (1)). In model (2) the associated coefficients for
the group dummies ‘Greeks-majority’ and ‘Greeks-only’ are positive and statistically significant.
This is to be interpreted that the groups with more Greeks have a higher probability of bribing
(as compared to the Germans-only group) in the early periods. The negative interaction terms
indicate that this positive effect on bribing in the early periods is decreased across periods. This
is consistent with the insight we gained from Figure 2. The rest of the variables are consistent, in
terms of direction of the effect and statistical significance, with model (1).
Model (3) augments model (2) by adding interaction terms of the group dummies with the ‘3rd
in queue’ dummy. This is to capture the differential effect depicted in Figure 3 and Figure 4 as well
as in the last two columns of Table 4, with respect to counter-bribes and queue-jumping bribes.
In addition, a Likelihood ratio test indicates that this model (model (3)) fits the data significantly
better (χ2 = 7.68, p − value = 0.053) than model (1). While most of the results are consistent
with our discussion for model (2) the introduction of additional interaction terms changes the
5The last period dummy captures the non-linearity arising from end-game effects i.e., the incentive in
the last period of the game is to select not to bribe the public official.
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Table 5: Random effects probit regressions (coefficient estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Germans-majority 0.095 (0.238) 0.407 (0.320) 0.300 (0.339) 0.376 (0.332)
Greeks-majority 0.288 (0.232) 0.544∗ (0.291) 0.423 (0.311) 0.490 (0.303)
Greeks-only 0.267 (0.245) 0.695∗∗ (0.294) 0.561∗ (0.320) 0.541∗ (0.310)
Period 0.062∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.084∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.084∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.059∗∗∗ (0.012)
3rd in queue 0.167∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.167∗∗∗ (0.048) -0.018 (0.093) 0.011 (0.098)
Last period -1.835∗∗∗ (0.120) -1.845∗∗∗ (0.120) -1.847∗∗∗ (0.120) -1.924∗∗∗ (0.154)
Germans-majority × Period - - -0.026∗∗ (0.011) -0.026∗∗ (0.011) -0.033∗∗∗ (0.012)
Greeks-majority × Period - - -0.022∗∗ (0.010) -0.022∗∗ (0.010) -0.029∗∗∗ (0.010)
Greeks-only × Period - - -0.036∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.036∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.045∗∗∗ (0.011)
Germans-majority × 3rd in queue - - - - 0.213∗ (0.122) 0.224 (0.145)
Greeks-majority × 3rd in queue - - - - 0.243∗∗ (0.123) 0.241∗ (0.133)
Greeks-only × 3rd in queue - - - - 0.269∗ (0.147) 0.279 (0.184)
N of times 2nd in queue - - - - - - 0.206∗∗ (0.083)
Minority - - - - - - -0.240∗∗ (0.113)
Constant -0.349∗ (0.200) -0.605∗∗ (0.248) -0.513∗∗ (0.261) -0.452∗ (0.244)
log(σ2u) 0.051 (0.250) 0.069 (0.251) 0.069 (0.251) 0.097 (0.479)
N 7248 7248 7248 7248
Log-likelihood -3553.203 -3541.602 -3537.763 -3463.544
Notes: Germans-only is the base group. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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discussion about the ‘3rd in queue’ variable which captures the difference between counter bribes
and queue-jumping bribes. More specifically, the ‘3rd in queue’ dummy is no longer statistically
significant while the interaction terms of the ‘3rd in queue’ dummy with the group dummies are
positive and statistically significant. The interpretation of these effects is that counter-bribes and
queue-jumping bribes do not differ significantly for the Germans-only group while for all the other
groups the probability of queue-jumping bribes are significantly higher than counter-bribes.
Model (4) introduces two additional controls with respect to the specification in model (3). One
of the additional variables is number of times a person was second in queue and was jumped at any
given period. As evident, this has a positive and statistically significant impact on bribing behavior
which is to say that subjects carry a long term memory over the outcome of the game at any given
period. The second variable is a ‘minority’ dummy signifying subjects that are a minority in their
group (i.e., 1 Greek in the German group or 1 German in the Greek group). This variable has a
negative and statistically significant effect on the probability of bribing. Model (4) fits the data
significantly better than model (3) based on a LR test (χ2 = 148.44, p− value < 0.001).6
Table A1 in Appendix B shows results from two additional specifications. Model (5) adds a set
of demographic variables like age, gender and experience with participating in other experiments.
Although this specification does not change any of our conclusions, a LR test does not reject the
null (χ2 = 1.09, p− value = 0.779) that this specification fits the data equally well with model (4).
In addition, model (6) adds a variable of political ideology in the specification with the downside of
a drop in sample size due to many non-responses. Results are robust to this specification as well.
Consequently, we base all our subsequent discussion on model (4) of Table 5.
6We also estimated a variant of model (4) where instead of the number of times a person has been
queue-jumped, we added two dummies: a) whether a person has been queue jumped once, and b) whether a
person has been queue jumped twice in a row. These two variables can be thought of as a proxy for beliefs
because they capture knowledge of whether one in the group bribes and whether both in the group bribe,
respectively. Results are essentially similar to model (4) in Table 5 and marginal effects similar to Figures 3
and 4 are produced (see Table A3 and Figures 7 and 8 in the Appendix). Moreover, we estimate that being
queue-jumped once increases the probability to bribe by 15.05% (p-value < 0.001) while being queue-jumped
twice in a row increases the probability to bribe by 30.52% (p-value < 0.001).
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3.3 Marginal Effects
Coefficients estimates from the probit models show the effects on the unobservable latent vari-
able. To quantify the effects for the main variables of interest, we estimated marginal effects for
the associated variables of interest.7 Figure 5 visualizes the estimated marginal effects associated
with the group dummies of model 4. The left part of Figure 5 presents average marginal effects
with their 95% CIs for counter bribes (i.e., subjects 2nd in queue). As evident, all marginal effects
span around zero indicating that groups do not differ in their counter bribing behavior across all
periods. The right part of Figure 5 shows the associated marginal effects and their 95% CIs for the
queue-jumping bribes (i.e., for subjects 3rd in queue). The graph indicates that up to period 7 sub-
jects in the Greeks-majority and the Greeks-only groups have a higher and statistically significant
probability of submitting queue-jumping bribes relative to the ‘Germans-only’ group. Table A2
indicates that this effect is equivalent to a 26.9% higher probability of a queue-jumping bribe for
the ‘Greeks only’ group (as compared to the ‘Germans only’ group) in period 1 and drops to 18.4%
in period 6. In later periods all marginal effects converge around zero which is an indication that
queue-jumping behavior converges for all groups to a non-significant difference.
7The estimation of marginal effects for interaction terms can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix B
shows the associated marginal effects.
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Figure 5: Average marginal effects for groups by period and bribe type with 95% CIs based
on model (4) of Table 5
Finally, Figure 6 shows the marginal effect of queue-jumping bribes vs. counter bribes across the
four different groups. This graph suggests that groups with Greek participants exhibit a positive
probability of queue-jumping bribes (as compared to counter-bribes). As we have seen before, the
difference is not significant for the ‘Germans-only’ group.
We further calculated the marginal effects for the rest of the variables of model (4) and we
only report inline what we thought is more interesting: a) subjects are 57.7% less likely to bribe
(p-value < 0.001) in the last period of the game - a significant end-game effect, b) each time a
person is queue-jumped over the course of the game increases the probability of bribing by 6.2%
(p-value = 0.01) and being in the minority of a group results in a 7.19% lower probability of bribing
(p-value = 0.03).
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Figure 6: Average marginal effects for queue-jumping bribes vs counter-bribes by group with
95% CIs based on model (4) of Table 5
4 Discussion and Conclusion
Our findings suggest that Greeks tend to bribe more often than Germans but only in the early
periods of the game. The Germans-only groups quickly catch up and by the 10th period any
differences in bribing rates that could be attributed to cultural norms fade away as the participants
familiarize themselves with the institutional setup of our experiment. Overall, we conclude that,
in the medium to long-term, it is institutions rather than culture that is the primary determinant
of differences in bribing attitudes across countries. Yet, in the short term, differences in cultural
norms may explain both how past equilibria may have come into fruition or influence the rate of
convergence to new equilibria.
Our study is the first to examine how the queuing process by which public administrations
provide the majority of their services may influence corruption. In our queue-jumping game, we
disentangle between bribes paid with the aim to jump the queue (i.e. queue-jumping bribes) and
bribes with the aim to maintain the current position in the queue (i.e. counter-bribes). Even
though both types of bribes are profit-maximizing, arguably, the latter carries a lower moral cost.
Queue-jumping bribes are motivated by an incentive to steal someone’s else turn. In contrast,
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counter-bribes are motivated by maintaining what is rightfully yours, i.e., your current position
in the queue. If cultural norms are identical across countries we should observe no differences on
the either of the two types of bribes. However, in designing this experiment, we anticipated an
asymmetric effect, where even though the aggregate bribe rates would be higher in the Greeks-only
treatment relative to the Germans-only treatment, the observed differences could be explained
by differences in counter-bribes. Confirming that hypothesis would have been in line with an
interpretation of our results that as Greeks have experienced more institutional corruption than
Germans (see Transparency International, 2013, 2017, 2020), they anticipate increased bribing
behavior from the start of the game. Yet our findings corroborate our initial intuition only in
part. Even though we find an asymmetric effect between the two types of bribes, the result is
in the opposite direction. Thus, in contrast to our original intuition, while counter-bribes are
not significantly different across populations, the Greeks-only and the Greek-majority groups, on
average, had a higher probability of offering a bribe to queue-jump than the Germans-only groups in
the early periods of the game. The observed differences persist even after we control for subject’s
beliefs concerning how many civilians in their group are willing to bribe to queue-jump. One
interpretation of the observed behavior could be that Greeks (Germans) are more (less) lenient
towards bribing behavior than Germans (Greeks). This interpretation would be in line with the
findings of Cameron et al. (2009) who observed that Indians were more likely to bribe but less
likely to punish than Australians, Indonesians, and Singaporeans, as well as the findings of Banuri
and Eckel (2015), who found that punishment was more successful with American than Pakistani
participants. As with punishment, an important implication of this result is that as counter-bribes
are relatively lower in the Greeks-only groups, bribing to queue-jump becomes more attractive,
which in turn may explain differences in bribing attitudes across populations. Future research
could further explore how cultural differences influence bribing attitudes across different types of
bribes, and examine how differences in queue lengths influence bribing behaviour.
In the intercultural treatments, we find that minorities, irrespective of their nationality, and
even though nobody else in the group can identify the minority civilian, bribe less. If cultural
differences and beliefs drive bribing, everything else constant, we should have found that both the
Greek and German minorities bribe more often relative to the Greeks-only and the Germans-only
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treatments, respectively. For the Greek minority, everything else constant, it is more profitable to
bribe in a group with lower bribe rates. Similarly, for the German minority, it is more costly not to
bribe in a group with higher average bribe rates. Thus, cultural differences could not explain our
results.8 Our interpretation of our result is that individuals, when a minority, tend to behave more
prosocially. This interpretation, although novel in the context of bribing behavior, is in line with
a large body of research in psychology on outgroup favoritism by minority groups (e.g. Hinkle and
Brown, 1990; Jost and Burgess, 2000; Hewstone et al., 2002). Tsutsui and Zizzo (2014) report an
experiment on the impact of group status on trust, trustworthiness, and discrimination. In line with
our results, they find that minorities tend to discriminate less and behave more prosocially towards
majorities. Overall, we believe that this finding indicates that studying intercultural behavior could
be an exciting avenue for future research.
8Our results cannot be explained by a social preference model with group identity either, as the model
would also predict that minorities would bribe more often. Another possibility is that bribing attitudes are a
positive function of beliefs. In that case, individuals would behave as conditional co-operators, i.e, bribe less
if they expect others to bribe less, and more if they expect others to bribe more. If so, we should observe that
the Greek minority subjects bribe less often and the German minority subjects bribe more often, relative to
their counterparts in the monocultural groups.
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
Welcome to our study! Please remain quiet and do not talk to the other participants during the 
study. Also, switch off your phones and any other mobile devices. The study will last up to 150 
minutes.  
 
The study is anonymous; this means that you will not know with whom of the other participants 
you are interacting. If you have any questions during the study please raise your hand and the 
person in charge will answer your question personally. 
 
There are no ‘correct’ or ‘wrong’ decisions in the study. However, how much you earn depends on 
your decisions and the decisions of the other participants. We advise you to read the instructions 
carefully.  
 
In the study, we speak not of €, but of ECU. Your income from this study is initially calculated in 
ECUs. At the end of the study, the ECUs earned are converted into Euro at a rate of 1 ECU = 2 
Cents and paid out to you. In addition, each participant receives a 4 Euro for showing up today.  
 
 
Study Overview 
 
The study is conducted simultaneously in two laboratories. One of the two laboratories is located 
in a university in Nuremberg (Germany) and the other in a university in Athens (Greece). All 
participants receive the same instructions (translated in their respective language).  
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In this study, there are two roles: A and B. At the beginning of the study, you are assigned a role 
at random. One participant A and three participants B form a group. Each participant 
remains in his role and in his group throughout the entire study.  
 
There are four different group compositions possible in this study:  
 
 Composition 1: Your group consists of  
o 3 participants B from the university in Nuremberg (Germany)  
o and 1 participant A from the university in Nuremberg (Germany). 
 Composition 2: Your group consists of 
o 3 participants B from the university in Athens (Greece)  
o and 1 participant A from the university in Athens (Greece). 
 Composition 3: Your group consists of  
o 1 participant B from the university in Nuremberg (Germany), 
o 2 participants B from the university in Athens (Greece), 
o and 1 participant A from the university in Athens (Greece). 
 Composition 4: Your group consists of  
o 1 participant B from the university in Athens (Greece), 
o 2 participants B from the university in Nuremberg (Germany), 
o and 1 participant A from the university in Nuremberg (Germany). 
 
The composition of groups will be randomly determined at the beginning of the study. Each 
participant remains in his composition throughout the study.  
 
The study consists of two stages: “Practice” and “Main Study”.  
 
At the beginning of the Main Study, you are informed about your role and your group 
composition on your computer screen.  
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Stage 1: Practice 
 
In the first stage, all participants have to carry out a task. The task consists of determining the 
correct amount of zeroes in a table consisting of the numbers 0 and 1. The format of the table (i.e., 
the number of lines and columns) is the same for all tasks and participants. The task is presented 
to participants on your screens, as in the example below. 
 
Each participant has 1 minute to carry out the task. After typing in the number the participant must 
confirm the answer by clicking the “Submit”-button. If a participant carries out the task correctly 
within 1 minute, he earns 100 ECU. If a participant does not carry out the task correctly within 
this timeframe, he will earn nothing (0 ECU) from the task. This stage is conducted two times. 
 
 
 
 
Example Task in Practice stage 
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Stage 2: Main Study 
 
At the start of this stage the three participants B are randomly queued (first, second or third). The 
first B is called “Orange”, the second is called “Green” and the third is called “Brown”. The colours 
have no particular meaning. The colours are simply used as nicknames to facilitate the 
understanding of the study. Note that the order of the participants in the queue will change during 
the study, while each participant keeps his nickname (the colour). The screen below displays the 
initial order at the beginning of the study. 
 
The participant B who is initially first in the queue (Orange) start by carrying out the Task Activity 
while the remaining participants B (Green and Brown) carry out the Choice Activity (explained 
below). 
 
   
 
Initial order at the beginning of the Study 
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Activity 1: Task 
The participant B, who is first in the queue, carries out this activity. He has to carry out the task, 
which is the same as the task completed in the Practice stage. Carrying out the task correctly within 
1 minute earns the participant 100 ECU. After 1 minute the tasks ends and the participant is 
automatically moved to the last position (position three) in the queue.  
 
 
 
Activity 1: Task 
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Activity 2: Choice 
This activity determines, who will be the next to carry out the Task Activity. While the 
participant B who is first in the queue carries out the Τask, the two participants B who are 
second and third in the queue carry out the Choice Activity. The two participants B in this 
activity have to make a choice.  
 
They have two options:  
 The first option is to wait for their turn.  
o If both participants choose this option, the participant B, who is currently the second 
in the queue, becomes the first and the currently third participant B becomes the 
second.  
 
 The second option is to pay to be moved to the front of the queue.  
 
o If only one participant B decides to pay to jump the queue this participant becomes 
the first in the queue. He pays 20 ECU. (15 ECU of his payment go to participant A and 
additional 5 ECU are deducted as administrative costs. These 5 ECU are not transferred 
to any other participant, i.e., they are destroyed in the process.) The other participant 
B becomes the second in the queue. 
 
o If both participants B decide to pay to jump the queue one of them is randomly 
selected to become the first in the queue. The participant B, who is selected to become 
the first pays 20 ECU. (15 ECU of his payment go to participant A and additional 5 ECU 
are deducted from his account as administrative cost.) In addition, the administrative 
cost of 5 ECU is deducted from the account of the other participant B. The other 
participant B becomes the second in the queue. 
 
The screenshot below displays your decision screen for the example in which you are Brown and 
currently third in the queue. 
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Activity 2: Choice 
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Participant A Activity 
This activity starts after the Task and Choice Activities are completed. In this activity the Participant 
A is informed about the performance of the participant B who was previously in the respective 
round taking part in the Task Activity. Participant A needs to confirm this by clicking “OK” within 
1 minute. By clicking “OK” the Participant A earns 35 ECU. If participant A does not click “OK” 
within 1 minute, he does not earn anything from this activity. This activity has no influence on 
Participant B’s earnings. In the meantime all Participants B need to wait for 1 minute.  
 
 
Participant A Activity 
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End of a Round 
After the end of the Participant A Activity one round is finished. At the end of a round all 
participants are informed about their earnings. In addition, each participant is informed about 
the decisions of all other participants B in his group and about their earnings. Hence, each 
participant is informed about the income of Participant A from the Choice Activity. Furthermore, 
each participant is informed about his current position in the queue before the start of the next 
round. 
 
 
 
Feedback screen 
 
 
 
The main study consists in total of 24 rounds. 
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Summary of the Earnings from the Main Study 
 
The Task Activity is to be carried out 24 times (24 rounds) and there are three participants B. Thus, 
if in no round any participant B would pay in the Choice Activity to jump the queue, the order 
would never be shuffled and each participant B could carry out the task 8 times. Hence, each 
participant B would earn 1000 ECU from the Task Activity and would not have to pay anything in 
the Choice Activity. The total amount earned by each participant B would be 800 ECU. Participant 
A would earn in total 840 ECU from the Participant A Activity and nothing in addition from the 
Choice Activity. 
 
If at some point in time a participant B would pay in the Choice Activity to jump the queue he could 
increase the number of times he could carry out the task in the Task Activity and consequently could 
increase his earnings. He would also increases the payoff of participant A. However, by doing so 
he would reduce the number of times the other participants B were able to carry out the task and 
consequently he would reduce their earnings. In addition, each time a participant B decides to pay 
for jumping the queue, money would be deducted from his account. This money would be 
destroyed in the process as administrative costs. Thus, the total money earned by the group of 
participants would be reduced.  
 
The following table provides some examples of participants’ earnings depending on their choices 
and on the choices made by other participants. Please note that these examples do not reflect all 
possible cases.  
 
Examples of Average Earnings (in ECU) 
 
Those who 
pay 
Those who 
do not pay 
A Admin 
Costs 
Example 1: No participant B ever pays to 
jump the queue - 800 840 0 
Example 2: One participant B always pays to 
jump the queue 960 600 1020 60 
Example 3: Two participants B always pays to 
jump the queue 942,5 33,33 1200 121,66 
Example 4: Each participant B always pays to 
jump the queue 600 - 1200 240 
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Please note that each participant B is free to choose to pay or not to pay to jump the queue in 
each round, i.e., he can always pay, never pay, or pay sometimes.  
 
After the completion of the main study you are requested to complete a questionnaire. In the 
meantime we will be preparing your payments. Then we will call you to hand out your payments 
to you. 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN OUR STUDY! 
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B Appendix: Additional tables
Table A1: Random effects probit regressions (coefficient estimates with additional controls)
(5) (6)
Germans-majority 0.387 (0.344) 0.488 (0.382)
Greeks-majority 0.496 (0.319) 0.636 (0.393)
Greeks-only 0.559∗ (0.330) 0.753∗∗ (0.384)
Period 0.058∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.061∗∗∗ (0.015)
Germans-majority × Period -0.033∗∗∗ (0.012) -0.030∗∗ (0.015)
Greeks-majority × Period -0.029∗∗∗ (0.010) -0.032∗∗ (0.014)
Greeks-only × Period -0.045∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.052∗∗∗ (0.014)
3rd in queue 0.011 (0.098) 0.044 (0.122)
Germans-majority × 3rd in queue 0.224 (0.141) 0.197 (0.184)
Greeks-majority × 3rd in queue 0.242∗ (0.133) 0.244 (0.193)
Greeks-only × 3rd in queue 0.278 (0.181) 0.263 (0.208)
Last period -1.924∗∗∗ (0.154) -1.972∗∗∗ (0.187)
N of times 2nd in queue 0.207∗∗ (0.083) 0.217∗∗ (0.103)
Minority -0.229∗∗ (0.109) -0.377∗ (0.202)
Age 0.011 (0.021) 0.016 (0.033)
Gender 0.090 (0.102) 0.027 (0.135)
Experience -0.002 (0.021) -0.001 (0.027)
Political ideology - - -0.054 (0.120)
Constant -0.732 (0.528) -0.821 (0.764)
log(σ2u) 0.096 (0.467) 0.189 (0.328)
N 7248 4439
Log-likelihood -3462.998 -2125.808
Notes: Germans-only is the base group. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table A2: Marginal effects for treatment groups by position in queue and rounds
Counter-bribes (2nd in queue) Queue Jumpting bribes (3rd in queue)
Germans-majority Greeks-majority Greeks-only Germans-majority Greeks-majority Greeks-only
R1 0.124 0.166 0.178∗ 0.202∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.095) (0.101)
R2 0.112 0.155 0.162 0.190∗ 0.235∗∗ 0.252∗∗
(0.113) (0.104) (0.105) (0.104) (0.093) (0.099)
R3 0.100 0.144 0.145 0.177∗ 0.223∗∗ 0.235∗∗
(0.110) (0.102) (0.104) (0.101) (0.090) (0.096)
R4 0.088 0.133 0.129 0.164∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.218∗∗
(0.107) (0.100) (0.102) (0.097) (0.088) (0.094)
R5 0.076 0.122 0.112 0.151 0.198∗∗ 0.201∗∗
(0.104) (0.098) (0.100) (0.094) (0.085) (0.091)
R6 0.064 0.110 0.096 0.138 0.186∗∗ 0.184∗∗
(0.101) (0.095) (0.098) (0.090) (0.083) (0.088)
R7 0.051 0.099 0.079 0.126 0.173∗∗ 0.167∗
(0.098) (0.092) (0.096) (0.087) (0.080) (0.086)
R8 0.040 0.088 0.063 0.113 0.161∗∗ 0.150∗
(0.095) (0.090) (0.094) (0.083) (0.077) (0.083)
R9 0.028 0.077 0.047 0.100 0.149∗∗ 0.134∗
(0.091) (0.087) (0.092) (0.080) (0.075) (0.081)
R10 0.016 0.066 0.031 0.088 0.137∗ 0.117
(0.088) (0.084) (0.090) (0.077) (0.072) (0.078)
R11 0.005 0.055 0.016 0.076 0.125∗ 0.101
(0.085) (0.081) (0.088) (0.073) (0.069) (0.075)
R12 -0.006 0.045 0.001 0.064 0.113∗ 0.086
(0.082) (0.079) (0.086) (0.070) (0.067) (0.073)
R13 -0.016 0.035 -0.014 0.053 0.102 0.071
(0.079) (0.076) (0.084) (0.067) (0.064) (0.071)
R14 -0.027 0.025 -0.028 0.042 0.091 0.056
(0.076) (0.073) (0.082) (0.064) (0.062) (0.069)
R15 -0.036 0.016 -0.041 0.031 0.080 0.042
(0.074) (0.071) (0.081) (0.062) (0.059) (0.067)
R16 -0.045 0.007 -0.054 0.021 0.070 0.029
(0.071) (0.069) (0.079) (0.059) (0.057) (0.065)
R17 -0.054 -0.002 -0.066 0.011 0.060 0.016
(0.069) (0.066) (0.078) (0.057) (0.055) (0.064)
R18 -0.062 -0.009 -0.078 0.002 0.051 0.003
(0.067) (0.064) (0.077) (0.055) (0.053) (0.062)
R19 -0.070 -0.017 -0.089 -0.006 0.042 -0.008
(0.065) (0.062) (0.076) (0.053) (0.051) (0.061)
R20 -0.077 -0.024 -0.100 -0.014 0.034 -0.019
(0.064) (0.061) (0.075) (0.051) (0.049) (0.060)
R21 -0.083 -0.030 -0.109 -0.022 0.026 -0.030
(0.063) (0.059) (0.074) (0.049) (0.048) (0.059)
R22 -0.089 -0.036 -0.119 -0.028 0.019 -0.039
(0.062) (0.058) (0.074) (0.048) (0.046) (0.059)
R23 -0.094 -0.041 -0.127∗ -0.035 0.012 -0.049
(0.061) (0.057) (0.073) (0.047) (0.045) (0.058)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table A3: Random effects probit regressions (coefficient estimates) with beliefs variables
(1)
Germans-majority 0.308 (0.331)
Greeks-majority 0.413 (0.302)
Greeks-only 0.489∗ (0.297)
Period 0.048∗∗∗ (0.008)
Germans-majority × Period -0.027∗∗ (0.012)
Greeks-majority × Period -0.024∗∗ (0.010)
Greeks-only × Period -0.039∗∗∗ (0.011)
3rd in queue 0.031 (0.101)
Germans-majority × 3rd in queue 0.226∗ (0.120)
Greeks-majority × 3rd in queue 0.256∗ (0.136)
Greeks-only × 3rd in queue 0.274∗∗ (0.129)
Last period -1.743∗∗∗ (0.125)
Been queue-jumped once 0.426∗∗∗ (0.069)
Been queue-jumped twice in a row 1.000∗∗∗ (0.085)
Minority -0.238∗∗ (0.107)
Constant -0.504∗∗ (0.250)
log(σ2u) -0.023 (0.123)
N 7248
Log-likelihood -3442.922
Notes: Germans-only is the base group. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
47
C Appendix: Additional figures
Figure 7: Average marginal effects for groups by period and bribe type with 95% CIs based
on Table A3
Figure 8: Average marginal effects for queue-jumping bribes vs counter-bribes by group with
95% CIs based on Table A3
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